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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to
bring procedural uniformity to the federal court system.' This
goal of uniform procedure, however, ran headlong into the emer-
gent Erie doctrine 2 One variant of the doctrine required federal
courts exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to apply
state rather than federal law if its application would change the
outcome of the case.$ Recognizing a conflict between the goals of
uniform federal procedure and of uniform outcome in state and
federal forums, the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer4
removed the Federal Rules from the purview of the Erie doc-
trine and announced a separate standard more solicitous of fed-
eral procedural uniformity.5 The Hanna Court, however, con-
1. In promulgating the original Federal Rules, the Supreme Court stated that proce-
dural uniformity is desirable because it allows lawyers in every state to learn and rely on
a system of rules, which, in turn, produces an "increase in the efficiency of the adminis-
tration of justice." ORDERS RE RULES OF PROCEDURE, 302 U.S. 783, 785 (1937). See infra
notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
2. The Erie doctrine had its genesis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Erie stands for the proposition that federal diversity courts must apply the substantive
law of the forum state. This substance-procedure dichotomy, founded on considerations
of federalism, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 55, at 255 (3d
ed. 1976), is a shorthand version of the Erie doctrine. See infra notes 35-42 and accom-
panying text.
3. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), greatly expanded the reach of the
Erie doctrine by replacing the substance-procedure dichotomy with what is referred to as
the "outcome determinative" test. This later variant of the Erie doctrine required fed-
eral diversity courts to follow state law if application of federal law would substantially
affect the outcome of the litigation. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
4. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
5. Hanna stands for the proposition that in a situation covered by a Federal Rule,
the federal diversity court must apply the Rule even in the face of a conflicting state law
unless the federal court finds that the Advisory Committee, Supreme Court, and Con-
gress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule did not transgress either the
Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). See infra notes 64-75 and accompany-
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founded lower courts and legal scholars by failing to overrule
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,6 decided under
the Erie doctrine and in apparent conflict with the Court's new
perspective on the Federal Rules. Legal commentators debated
Ragan's continued vitality,7 lower courts split,8 and both groups
pleaded for Supreme Court guidance.9
The Supreme Court answered their pleas in Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp.,10 where the Court, relying on Ragan," held
that state commencement provisions, rather than the Federal
Rule," toll state statutes of limitations in diversity of citizenship
cases. The Court justified its affirmation of Ragan and Use of the
state provision by characterizing Federal Rule 3 as "not broad
enough" to control the tolling issue." The Court employed an
Erie doctrine analysis, 15 finding no direct federal-state law con-
flict as required for application of the Hanna analysis." The
Walker Court's version of the direct conflict test, however,
invites overly literal interpretations of the Federal Rules and
ing text.
6. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Chief Justice Warren characterized Rule 3, the Federal Rule
involved in Ragan, as not broad enough to govern the issue of tolling the state statute of
limitations. Rule 4(d)(1), in contrast, was considered explicit enough to govern service of
process, the issue in Hanna. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 n.12 (1965). See infra
notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
7. Professors Wright and Miller, for example, maintained that Ragan was still good
law after Hanna. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvIL §
1057, at 191 (1969). Contra Zabin, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie in
Retreat, 53 A.B.A. J. 266, 268 (1967).
8. Compare Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974) (Ragan no longer good law), with Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530
F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976) (Ragan required application of state law).
9. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S.
740 (1980). The appeals court in Walker viewed Hanna and Ragan as irreconcilable,
reluctantly followed Ragan, and asked the Supreme Court to "clear away the dilemma
which exists as a result of the conflict between Ragan and Hanna." Id. at 1136. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2 § 59, at 277; Siegel, The Federal Rules in Diversity Cases: Erie
Implemented, Not Retarded, 54 A.B.A. J. 172, 175 (1968); Comment, Statutes of Limi-
tation in Diversity Cases: For Whom the Statute Tolls, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 131, 132
(1973); Comment, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in
Diversity Cases, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1968).
10. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
11. For a discussion of Ragan, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
12. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West Supp. 1981). For the text of the statute, see
infra note 21.
13. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Clv.
P. 3.
14. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1980).
15. For a discussion of Erie, see infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Hanna, see infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
Federal Rule 3
disuniformity in federal procedure. The Court's reliance on
Ragan, clearly the product of earlier judicial theories no longer
prevalent, will also confuse rather than clarify the already per-
plexing Federal Rules jurisprudence. The unfortunate result of
Walker may be an unpredictable hybridization of federal and
state procedure in federal diversity cases.
This article evaluates the Walker case in the context of Erie
doctrine cases preceding it, and of later federal cases attempting
to follow it. First, this article examines the facts and reasoning
in Walker. Next, the article reviews the case law leading up to
Walker, and then focuses on the flaws in the Walker analysis.
After critically evaluating Walker, the article examines a Ninth
Circuit decision interpreting Walker. Last, this article suggests
that lower courts narrowly interpret Walker, restricting its scope
to cases involving Federal Rule 3.
II. WALKER v. ARMCO STEEL CORP.
The factual circumstances in Walker are nearly identical to
those in Ragan.1 7 A nail fragment hit Walker in the eye on
August 22, 1975.18 Walker filed his complaint in federal district
court19 on August 19, 1977, three days before the two-year state
statute of limitations would have expired. Summons issued the
next day, but process was not served until December 1, 1977.Y0
The district court dismissed the complaint on the authority of
Ragan, holding that an Oklahoma statute requiring service of
process to commence an action 1 was an integral part of the
17. Indeed, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Walker, found the two
cases "indistinguishable." Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980).
18. Id. at 741.
19. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
20. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 740, 742 (1980).
21. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West Supp. 1981).
An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article, as to
each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him, or on a
codefendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest with him.
Where service by publication is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced
at the date of the first publication. An attempt to commence an action shall be
deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this
article, when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure
service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service of
the summons, or if service is sought to be procured by mailing, but a receipt of
certified mail containing summons, within sixty (60) days.
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state's limitations statute.22 The court reasoned that because it
was part of the state's substantive law, the state commencement
statute had to be applied. Feeling constrained by Ragan, the
Tenth Circuit reluctantly agreed."3
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
Ragan24 is still good law, and that in diversity actions Rule 3
does not toll the state statute of limitations.25 The Court used a
two-part analysis. First, the Court found that the plain meaning
of Rule 3, which simply states that an action is commenced
when the complaint is filed,28 indicated that it was not broad
enough to govern the tolling issue. 7 To demonstrate the narrow
sphere of Rule 3, the Court pointed out that its author, the
Advisory Committee, raised but never answered the question of
whether filing a complaint under Rule 3 also tolls the state stat-
ute of limitations.2
22. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 452 F. Supp. 243, 245 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
23. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1979). The court of
appeals applied Ragan despite having concluded that Ragan relied on the York outcome
determinative test in an area of pure procedure, and therefore is irreconcilable with
Hanna. Id. at 1135-36. Finding that Ragan could not have survived Hanna's redefinition
of the relationship between the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules, yet acknowledging
that Hanna had not overruled Ragan, the court asked the Supreme Court to "clear away
the dilemma." Id. For a discussion of Ragan and Hanna, see infra notes 55-86 and
accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of Ragan, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
25. "In our view, in diversity actions, Rule 3 governs the date from which various
timing requirements of the federal rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes
of limitations." Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980). The Court cited 4
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1057, at 191 (1969),
as authority for this proposition.
26. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Clv.
P. 3.
27. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50, 750 n.9 (1980).
28. Id. at 750 n.10.
When a federal or state statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a ques-
tion may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops
the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as,
service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for ser-
vice. The answer to this question may depend on whether it is competent for
the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without
affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations.
The requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons
and deliver it to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a ques-
tion arising.
446 U.S. at 750 n.10 (quoting Note of the Advisory Comm. on the Rules).
One commentator attributed the Rule's lack of explicitness regarding its tolling
effect to the Committee's concern that Rule 3 not infringe on substantive rights in viola-
tion of the Erie doctrine and of the Rules Enabling Act. The Supreme Court, however,
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Second, the Court relied on a variant of the Erie doctrine 29
taken from Ragan, the integral part test.30 Concluding that the
state commencement provision was an integral part of the sub-
stantive policies underlying the state statute of limitations, 1 the
Court adhered to Ragan3 2 and applied the state statute.33 The
Walker Court concluded that absent a controlling Federal Rule,
a diversity action that would have been barred in state court by
the limitations statute should not be allowed to proceed in fed-
eral court "solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity
of citizenship between the litigants." 3'
III. ERIE AND THE FEDERAL RULES
Walker has its philosophical roots in the 1938 landmark
case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, ss referred to in a later
Supreme Court decision as "one of the modern cornerstones of
our federalism. 3 6 Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson,3 7 a case that
rejected this narrow view of the authority of the Act in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1940). In Sibbach, the Court held that the proper test for determining whether a
Rule is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act is whether it "really regulates proce-
dure." Id. at 14. See Comment, Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure After Hanna v.
Plumer: Rule 3, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1139, 1146 (1967). For a discussion of Sibbach see
infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
30. The integral part test first appeared in the Tenth Circuit opinion in Ragan, and
was adopted by the Supreme Court as an additional basis for its affirmance. Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse, 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949). For a discussion of Ragan
see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
31. Under Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), state statutes of limita-
tions are substantive law, binding on federal diversity courts. See infra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
33. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980). "IThe Oklahoma
statute is a statement of substantive decision by that state," id. at 751, "part and parcel
of the statute of limitations." Id. at 752. The actual service requirement was character-
ized as promoting the same policy goals as the statute of limitations: establishing a dead-
line after which the defendant may have peace of mind, and avoiding the unfairness of
forcing him to defend an old claim. Id. "[Rlule 3 does not replace such policy determina-
tions found in state law." Id.
34. Id. at 753.
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine so permeates modern procedural jurispru-
dence that Judge Learned Hand once stated: "I don't suppose a civil appeal can now be
argued to us without counsel sooner or later quoting large portions of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins." Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946).
36. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965)(Harlan, J., concurring). See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 55, at 255. "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the
Erie decision. It . . .goes to the heart of the relations between the federal government
and the states." Other scholars concur. "[E]rie is by no means simply a case .... [I]t is
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had interpreted the Rules of Decision Act 8 as requiring applica-
tion of only statutory and not state decisional law in federal
diversity cases. Discrimination in favor of non-citizens able to
"forum-shop" between the federal and state courts, 9 as well as
constitutional considerations of federalism,'0 prompted the Erie
Court to rule that federal diversity courts must apply the sub-
stantive decisional as well as the substantive statutory law of the
forum state.,1 Federal diversity courts could continue, however,
to apply federal procedural law,' 2 namely, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure enacted the same year.
The Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in order to bring predictability and uniformity to federal
practice.'" Believing the Federal Rules to be the quintessence of
procedure and therefore firmly fixed on the procedural side of
the very essence of our federalism." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693, 695 (1974). Accord Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L.
REV. 427, 427-28 (1958); Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie Versus
Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377, 380 (1967).
37. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
38. "[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or stat-
utes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976)).
39. Forum shopping reached its apex in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). In Black & White, a
Kentucky corporation reincorporated in Tennessee and created diversity of citizenship
between itself and its main competitor in order to enforce a contract in federal court that
would have been declared void if sued upon in a Kentucky state court. But see Hill,
supra note 36. The author argues that because the purpose underlying the constitutional
provision for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was to provide litigants with a choice of
tribunals, the elimination of forum shopping could not have been the Court's primary
objective in Erie.
40. See supra note 36.
41. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by the Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern." Id. at 78.
In so ruling, the Court returned to the states power reserved to them by the tenth
amendment that "had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government."
Id. at 78-80. For a thorough analysis of Erie's constitutional basis, see C. WRiGHT, supra
note 2, § 56, and Hill, supra note 36.
42. "[N]o one doubts federal control over procedure." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). See infra note 45.
43. See supra note 1. "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring
about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules." Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322
F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)). See Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on
the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 715 (1950); Comment, supra note 28, at 1139.
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the Erie substance-procedure dichotomy,44 the Court may not
have foreseen the possibility of the Erie doctrine and the Rules
clashing over matters classifiable as either substance or proce-
dure." That the Court considered the Federal Rules to be pre-
sumptively procedural is supported by language in the Rules
Enabling Act. The Rules Enabling Act, the legislation authoriz-
ing the Federal Rules, provides that the Rules shall not
"abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights of any litigant."94 6
Had the Court regarded this language as the appropriate stan-
dard by which to judge the Federal Rules, requiring, in each
case, an examination of the Rule and a search for substantive
policy underlying its state counterpart, the Rules Enabling Act
would have been a "thoroughly self-defeating piece of legisla-
tion. ' 47 A more reasonable conclusion is that the Court took
note of the Act's limiting language and determined the Federal
Rules to be federal procedural law, that, under the Erie doc-
trine,40 need not give way to conflicting state procedural law.40
44. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
45. Indeed, Mr. Justice Reed stated in his concurring opinion in Erie that while the
substance-procedure distinction is sometimes blurred, "no one doubts federal power over
procedure." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Never-
theless, after Erie, some scholars feared that the Court would abandon the Erie sub-
stance-procedure dichotomy and allow state procedure to supplant the Federal Rules,
thereby destroying the uniformity sought by the drafters of the new system of federal
procedure. See Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc. 158 (1941); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure"
After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939).
46. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1976)).
47. Hill, supra note 36, at 580, 585.
48. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
49. The view that the Rules are presumptively procedural for the purpose of the
Erie substance-procedure dichotomy is further buttressed by the practical realization
that any system of procedure contains some elements of substantive policy and will, on
occasion, unavoidably alter state substantive law. Hill, supra note 36, at 580, 585. Accord
Comment, supra note 28, at 1146.
For the view that the limiting language of the Rules Enabling Act should be
regarded as a check on the operation of the Federal Rules, see Ely, supra note 36, at 698,
722-23, discussed infra note 51, and McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine
Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965). See also Stason, supra note 36. Stason argues
that the Sibbach approach violates the separation of powers doctrine because resolving
the substance-procedure dichotomy issue involves considerations of federalism under the
10th amendment, and is therefore necessarily a matter for judicial determination. Id. at
395, 403-04. This analysis, however, ignores the Court's promulgations of the Federal
Rules, which presumably entailed the Court's attention to their procedural or substan-
tive nature under the Erie substance-procedure dichotomy test. The Court performed its
reviewing function at this stage, and evidently found the Rules constitutionally valid
under Erie.
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Accordingly, in its first major decision interpreting the Rules,
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,50 the Court rejected the Rules Ena-
bling Act proviso as the standard for judging the Federal Rules,
adopting the more liberal standard of whether the Rule "really
regulates procedure."'61
Although the Federal Rules are by definition procedural and
the Erie doctrine52 requires application of only substantive state
law, the integrity of the new procedural system was jeopardized
by two decisions rendered in the 1940's that vastly expanded the
reach of the Erie doctrine. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,"3 the
Court enunciated the "outcome determinative" test for resolving
state-federal conflicts of law. Under this later rendition of the
Erie doctrine, a federal diversity court is required to apply state
law, procedural or substantive, if its use in place of federal law
would change the result in a particular case.54
Guided by the York outcome determinative test, the Court
in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.55 concluded
50. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
51. Id. at 14. This approach requires a court to focus only on the procedural nature
of the Rule, without reference to substantive state policies on which its operation might
infringe.
Professor Ely criticizes the Sibbach Court for assuming that the categories of sub-
stance and procedure are mutually exclusive, arguing that a Rule can "really regulate
procedure" and also abridge substantive rights. In his view, the appropriate standard for
judging the validity of the Rules is the Rules Enabling Act, asking first, whether it regu-
lates practice and procedure, and second, whether it does so without altering substantive
rights. The Sibbach analysis reaches only the first question and assumes the second has
been answered in the affirmative. Professor Ely further argues that by ignoring the sec-
ond sentence regarding abridgement of substantive rights, Sibbach "obliterated" the Act,
creating a need for limits on the Federal Rules. This need was filled by applying the Erie
doctrine to cases involving Federal Rules, such as Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 377
U.S. 530 (1949), rather than by reconsidering the liberal Sibbach test. Ely, supra note 36,
at 698-99.
52. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
53. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
54. Id. at 109. Scholars concerned about uniform application of the Federal Rules
severely criticized York's application to cases involving the Rules. See C.WRIGHT supra
note 2, § 55, at 256; Merrigan, supra note 43 at 717-18. See Clark, Federal Procedural
Reform and States' Rights: To a More Perfect Union, 40 TEx. L. REV. 211 (1961). Judge
Clark commented that York carried the delicate question of federalism "to an absurd
extreme." Id. at 220. Professor Hart remarked that the outcome test "had no readily
apparent stopping place." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512 (1954). Proponents of limiting federal power, however, praised
York for its easy application and predictability. E.g., Stason, supra note 36, at 391.
55. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Ragan involved an automobile accident which occurred on
October 1, 1943. The plaintiff filed the complaint in federal court on September 4, 1945,
well within the Kansas two-year limitations statute. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306(3) (1935)
(current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(4) (1976 Ann.)). Process, however, was not
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that the use of Rule 3" as a tolling provision would have varied
the outcome. Therefore, Rule 3 and its uniform application in
federal courts must yield to the state commencement law.57
Subordinate to the Ragan Court's York outcome determinative
rationale was an additional theory derived from the lower
court opinion," the integral part test. The Court applied the
state service provision, reasoning that it was an integral part of
the state limitations statute,60 considered substantive law under
York, 61 and therefore binding on federal diversity courts under
the Erie substance-procedure analysis.62 In cases involving both
served on the defendant until December 28, 1945. 337 U.S. at 531. The Tenth Circuit
held that the Kansas commencement provision, KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306(8) (1949) (cur-
rent version at § 60-203 (1976 Ann.)), requiring receipt of summons by the defendant in
order to commence the action, rather than Rule 3, tolls the limitations statute. Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 170 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1948). The Supreme
Court affirmed. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
56. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ.
P. 3.
57. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). "We can-
not give it longer life in the federal court than it would have had in the state court
.... .Id. at 533-34.
58. The Ragan Court's heavy reliance on the York test for judging the Federal Rules
led many jurists and scholars to conclude that Ragan was no longer good law after
Hanna, since that Court unequivocally rejected the York outcome determinative test
where the federal-state law conflict involves Federal Rules. See, e.g., Zabin, supra note 7
at 268. For a discussion of the Hanna Court's treatment of Ragan, see infra notes 76-86
and accompanying text.
59. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 170 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1948).
60. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949).
61. For a discussion of York, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
62. For a discussion of Erie, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
Several scholars have argued that the integral part analysis was superfluous to the
Ragan result. See Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases: For Whom the
Statute Tolls, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 131, 138-39 (1973); Comment, Federal Rule 3 and the
Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1283
(1968).
One commentator theorized that because the precise foundation on which Ragan
rested was so uncertain, perhaps the Court's conclusion was based on an unexpressed
third rationale: application of Rule 3 in this situation would have "abridged, enlarged, or
modified substantive rights" in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. Hill, supra note 36
at 430. However, this explanation is implausible because the opinion made no reference
to the Act, much less to its limiting provision. The analysis is also flawed because the
Court eight years earlier in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1949), see notes 50 &
51, supra, held that the test for validity of the Rules is not whether they alter substan-
tive law, but whether they "really regulate procedure." Id. at 14. See supra notes 50-51.
Some commentators hold the view that the proper standard for the Rules is whether the
operation of the Rule would infringe on substantive policies underlying the Rule's state
counterpart, see Ely, supra note 36, at 698, 722-23; McCoid, supra note 49, at 884;
Stason, supra note 36, at 395-96. Professor Ely agrees with the Ragan result, but argues
that it was arrived at incorrectly through the Erie route rather than by using the Ena-
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the Erie doctrine and the Federal Rules, the Court seemed to be
favoring the Erie doctrine, and the Federal Rules were rapidly
losing ground. 3
Sixteen years later, though, in Hanna v. Plumer," the Court
removed the Federal Rules from the jurisdiction of the Erie doc-
trine, announcing a new three-part analysis to judge their valid-
ity.6' First, the court must determine whether the Federal Rule
is broad enough to govern the issue in dispute.6 If it does apply,
then the Rule supplants any state law with which it directly col-
lides.6 Second, the court must decide whether the Rule regu-
lates procedure within the limitations set out in the Rules
Enabling Act.6 8 The standard derived from Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co.'" is whether the Rule "really regulates procedure." 0 Third,
bling Act standard.
63. Scholars concerned with the integrity of the Federal Rules immediately con-
demned Ragan. See Driver, The Federal Civil Rules in Diversity Cases, 30 OR. L. REv.
69 (1959); Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1949); Note, The
Erie Case and the Federal Rules-A Prediction, 39 GEO. L.J. 600 (1951).
For litigants yearning for predictable rules on which to rely, "there can be no solace
here," one concluded. 34 CORNELL L.Q. 420, 421 (1949). This "Erie invasion of the Fed-
eral Rules," as one writer dubbed it, engendered unprecedented uncertainty and confu-
sion among attorneys. See Merrigan, supra note 43. "Practising attorneys are unable to
determine which of the Federal Rules will remain in full effect and which might be
rejected by the courts on the theory that they conflict in a substantial way with some
state law. Every important step in a federal diversity case is taken today at a calculated
risk." Id. at 711-12.
64. 380 U.S. 460. Some praised Hanna as guaranteeing the integrity of the federal
procedural system, see, e.g., Zabin, supra note 7, at 269, while others condemned it as
fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional foundation of the Erie doctrine, see,
e.g., Stason, supra note 36. Stason likens the Hanna decision to the discredited Swift
doctrine because both attempt to achieve federal uniformity at the cost of invading
state's rights and violate the equal protection rights of non-diverse litigants. Id. at 401.
The author contends that Erie reaffirms the federal system while Hanna saps its
strength. Id. at 377.
65. In Hanna, the plaintiff served process by leaving copies of the summons and
complaint with the spouse of the executor of the decedent-defendant's estate, pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). See infra note 72. State law, however, required in-hand service
of process. MASs. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958). See infra note 73. The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the state service statute and
statute of limitations, and the court of appeals affirmed. 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
The Supreme Court reversed. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
66. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
67. Id. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text for an evaluation of the direct
collision test, as applied by Walker.
68. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965). See supra notes 46-49 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Rules Enabling Act.
69. 312 U.S. 1 (1949).
70. Id. at 14. The Court implicitly rejected as a standard the Rules Enabling Act's
proviso that the Rules cannot "abridge, enlarge, or modify" state substantive rights. See
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the court must inquire whether the Rule is the product of a con-
stitutional exercise of Congressional authority. The test for con-
stitutionality is whether the Rule is "rationally capable of classi-
fication as procedural. 7 1 Finding that Federal Rule 4(d)(1)7 2
"unavoidably clashed" with the state service of process statute,8
that Rule 4(d)(1) did not exceed the scope of the Rules Enabling
Act, and that the Rule was constitutional, 4 the Hanna Court
supra notes 49 & 51, for a discussion of this standard. The Court instead chose the
liberal Sibbach test, discussed supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
Critics of the Hanna decision contend the Court's reliance on Sibbach is misplaced
because Sibbach did not involve a conflict between state and federal law, but only the
validity of Rules 35 and 37. McCoid, supra note 49, at 396; Stason, supra note 36, at 905.
71. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). The Court found constitutional
authority for enactment of the Federal Rules in U.S. CONST. art. III, providing for a
federal court system, augmented by U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to make procedural
rules for federal courts and to regulate matters neither substantive nor procedural but
"rationally capable of classification as either." 380 U.S. at 472.
The Court also provided the Federal Rules with a strong presumption of validity.
The Court held that a federal court must apply the Federal Rule even in face of a con-
flicting state law with substantive aspects, unless the court finds that the Advisory Com-
mittee, the Supreme Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the
Rule did not transgress either the Enabling Act or Constitution. Id.
See also 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 345 (1966). The author elaborates on the Hanna presump-
tion of validity, stating that unless the Rule clearly regulates substance, it will be pre-
sumed procedural and must be applied in lieu of the conflicting state statute. Id. at 351.
See also Zabin, supra note 7. Zabin states that the test for validity of the Enabling Act is
the same as that for any statute: whether the statute is appropriate and plainly adapted
to effectuate its objective. But cf. Siegel, supra note 9, at 173 (Hanna did not foreclose
the possibility that the presumption of validity protecting a Rule could be rebutted by
demonstrating its infringement on substantive rights in violation of the Erie doctrine).
Critics of the Hanna presumption argue that the question of whether a Rule alters sub-
stantive state policy in violation of federalism, the Erie doctrine, and the Rules Enabling
Act can only be answered by examining the purposes underlying the contrary state law.
See McCoid, supra note 49, at 901.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) provides:
The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall fur-
nish the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall
be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or incompetent person, by deliver-
ing a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leav-
ing copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some per-
son of suitable age and discretion then residing therein....
73. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958), provides that the plaintiff must
make personal service upon the executor or administrator of an estate within one year of
the date he obtained the bond, or the plaintiff must file in probate court a notice stating
the name of the estate, name of the creditor, amount of the claim, and the court in which
the action was brought.
74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965). The Rule "neither exceeded the
Congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed Constitu-
tional bounds. Id.
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held that Rule 4(d)(1) controlled. 5
The Hanna Court did not, however, overrule Ragan.76 The
Court instead distinguished Ragan as a case involving a clash
between a Federal Rule and a state statute that was not "una-
voidable. '77 Rule 3, then, did not govern the tolling issue, and
the reasoning in the last two parts of the Court's new analytical
formula did not apply.
The Hanna Court's characterization of Ragan is mislead-
ing78 for two reasons. First, nowhere in its opinion did the Ragan
Court intimate that its reasoning was based on a narrow inter-
pretation of Rule 3.79 Rather, the Ragan Court presumed that
Rule 3 governed tolling, and disposed of the case under the York
outcome determinative test.80 Furthermore, the Court in Ragan
acknowledged that Rule 3 tolls limitations statutes in federal
question cases not bound by the Erie doctrine,8" and thus found
that Rule 3 would otherwise have reached the tolling issue.82
Second, the Hanna Court drew a dubious distinction between
75. Id. at 464.
76. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
77. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 & n.12 (1965).
78. Id. This creative characterization of Ragan may not have been "good history,"
Professor Ely comments, but it did allow the Court to conveniently reduce Ragan's value
as authority for the view that the Erie doctrine provides a check on the Federal Rules,
without involving the Court in a full scale analysis of the Rules Enabling Act. Ely, supra
note 36, at 732 n.209.
In his concurring opinion in Hanna, Justice Harlan recognized the flaws in the
majority's characterization of Ragan. He contended that "if still good law," Ragan would
have required the opposite result. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). He argued that Ragan should have been overruled because it "was wrong."
Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
79. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ.
P. 3.
80. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. See Comment, supra note 28, at
1144. Had the Ragan Court disposed of the tolling issue on the ground that Rule 3 was
irrelevant, its discussion of the York outcome determinative test, see supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text, and of the integral part test would have been unnecessary. See
Comment, A Restrained Adherence to Ragan-States Versus Federal Rules When Toll-
ing State Limitations Periods in Diversity Cases, 18 S.D.L. REV. 185, 193-94 (1973);
Comment, Federal Rule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity
Cases, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1281, 1287 n.41 (1968).
81. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
The Walker Court did not answer the question of whether Rule 3 tolls statutes of
limitations when jurisdiction is based on a federal question. Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 447 U.S. 740, 751 n.12 (1980). However, in Board of Regents of the Univ. of New
York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), decided two weeks before Walker, the Court held
an action based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, time barred by the
New York statute of limitations.
82. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1144; see authorities cited supra note 80.
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the two Federal Rules involved in Hanna and Ragan. Conclud-
ing that Rule 4(d)(1) 5 "implicitly, but with unmistakable clar-
ity" rejects in-hand service of process, the Hanna Court found
the Rule sufficiently broad and allowed it to supplant the state
provision. " Applying the same reasoning to Ragan, the Court
could have found that by defining when an action is commenced,
Rule 3 implicitly, but with the same degree of clarity, tolls the
limitations statute.8 5 By distinguishing Ragan in this intellectu-
ally unsatisfying fashion, the Court caused further confusion
among courts and commentators over Ragan's precedential
import.86
IV. WALKER: FLAWED ANALYSIS
The Court in Walker may have eliminated lower court con-
fusion over the applicability of Rule 3 at the expense of greater
lower court uncertainty regarding the applicability of all the
Federal Rules. This uncertainty derives from two flaws in the
Court's analysis: its reliance on Ragan8 7 and on a plain meaning
83. For text of statute, see supra note 73.
84. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
85. For an elaboration of this argument, see 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 345, 353 (1966).
86. Notwithstanding the Hanna Court's attempt to distinguish Ragan, some com-
mentators and courts reasoned that Ragan, whose result turned on the York outcome
determinative test, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text, could not possibly
have survived Hanna's redefinition of the relationship between Erie and the Federal
Rules. They concluded that Hanna had overruled Ragan sub silentio. See, e.g., Zabin,
supra note 7 at 268.
Some lower courts agreed. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1968); Manatee v. Cablevision Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1977); Benn v.
Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Other courts reasoned that because Hanna had intentionally distinguished rather
than overruled Ragan, they were bound to apply the state rule. See, e.g., Rose v. K.K.
Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1979); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979); Witherow v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v.
Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1962).
Still other courts acknowledged that Ragan was valid, but were able to distinguish
the facts in their cases from Ragan. See, e.g., Prashar v. Volkswagan of America, Inc.,
480 F.2d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974); Chappell v. Rouch,
448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
87. For an analysis of Walker, see supra notes 17-34 and acccompanying text. For a
discussion of Ragan, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. Alonzo v. AFC Prop-
erty Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981), demonstrates the difficulty in fol-
lowing the Walker analysis. See infra notes 119-137 and accompanying text.
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analysis of the scope of the Federal Rule. 8
The Walker Court's strong affirmance of Ragan could easily
bewilder a lower court attempting to reconcile Ragan with the
later Erie doctrine cases. As did the Court in Hanna, the
Walker Court explained Ragan as a case where the Federal Rule
was not broad enough to control the disputed issue, tolling the
limitations statute.8 9 This direct collision analysis,90 however, is
nowhere found in the brief Ragan opinion. Rather, Ragan
turned primarily on a rather mechanistic application of the York
outcome determinative test.9' The Court's revisionism creates a
situation where a lower federal court judge, seeking to grasp
Ragan's precedential significance, would have to disregard the
actual Ragan opinion, and instead seek its modern meaning
within the pages of Hanna and Walker.
The meaning of a particular judicial decision does not, of
course, derive entirely from the opinion itself. Modern legal
scholars have demonstrated that the full significance of a case
unfolds only when the case is viewed in the context of other rele-
vant decisions.92 This is because the common law is not simply a
static compilation of independent rules, but an integrated body
of coordinated principles, continually evolving as new decisions
join its ranks.9s It follows from the notion of a dynamic, chang-
88. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. For an evaluation of the plain
meaning analysis as applied to the direct collision test, see infra notes 89-112 and accom-
panying text.
89. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
90. The "direct collision" test is part one of the Hanna three-part analysis. See
supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. Under part two, the court asks whether the
Rule exceeds the limitations set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Id. See also supra
notes 43-51 and accompanying text. The third part of the analysis involves an inquiry
into the constitutionality of the Rule. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., A. HARARi, THE PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 11-18
(1962). "[T]he significance of any decision emerges only when it is seen both in the spe-
cial context of the case in which it was given and in the wider context of all other rele-
vant decisions." Id. at 15.
An earlier view held that the meaning of a case consisted of its material facts plus
the decision, without regard to other relevant law. This perspective was prevalent among
legal scholars during the late nineteenth century, when the notion that law is a science
had a significant currency. See C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS v-vii (1871), reprinted in S. PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AmRImCAN HISTORY
657 (1980). Most modern legal historians reject this view that law develops autonomously
from social forces. "Lawyers and judges raised on the method,. . . came to speak of law
mainly in terms of a dry, arid logic, divorced from society and life." L. FREmAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 535 (1973).
93. "[E]very decision of a court whose decisions are binding as precedents, which
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ing law that the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi, also
changes as new cases are added to the body of precedent. A
case's ratio decidendi, then, is the rule of law the case will sup-
port when harmonized with all relevant prior and subsequent
decisions.94
The Walker and Hanna Courts did not, however, merely
harmonize Ragan with their more modern pronouncements on
the Erie doctrine. Rather, they invented a new legal theory
nowhere alluded to in the Ragan opinion. 5 This is not the grad-
ual, evolutionary process by which the common law develops,
but a serious distortion of history that failed to reconcile the
cases in an intellectually satisfying fashion.
The Walker Court's affirmance of Ragan may have
stemmed from legitimate yet misdirected judicial concerns.
Courts are traditionally averse to overruling previous decisions,
preferring instead to allow the law to change in an evolutionary
fashion by integrating new principles into the existing body of
precedent. This general predisposition toward steady and
orderly legal development reflects society's conception of law as
embodying relatively stable and internally consistent legal stan-
dards, whose application to similar cases yields similar results."
The Court in Walker and Hanna may have decided to reaffirm
Ragan despite the Court's later, radical departure from Ragan's
theoretical approach in order to preserve this public perception
of a stable and reliable common law.
The popular conception of a relatively stable common law,
however, would have been better preserved by overruling Ragan,
rather than attempting to force it into Hanna's new legal mold.
Overruling a discordant decision defines the boundaries and con-
firms the correctness of the coordinated decisional law. Distin-
guishing and affirming it, in contrast, further confuses lower
courts and commentators about the precise contours of the
has not been reversed by a superior court, is in accordance with the law. . . . [W]hat we
mean by 'the law' are all these decisions pieced together." A. HARAM, supra note 92, at
13.
94. This is the definition of ratio decidendi offered by Abraham Harari. Id. at 17.
95. The determinative theory of the Ragan result was derived from Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
96. See Welker, Judging the Judges: A Case Study in Judicial Responsibility, 5 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 47 (1981). Welker discusses the five social policy goals underlying
the doctrine of stare decisis: ensuring equal treatment of litigants; encouraging public
reliance on existing laws; providing for stability in legal standards; providing judicial
efficiency; and inspiring public confidence in the legal system. Id. at 51-54.
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reshaped legal paradigm.9 7 The lower court confusion is inevita-
bly translated into inconsistent outcomes in similar cases, creat-
ing the very instability and discontinuity in the law that under-
mines public confidence in the legal system. Instead of trying to
somehow fit Ragan into the new Hanna approach to the Federal
Rules, the Walker Court should have acknowledged Ragan's
total dependence on the York outcome determinative test,e8 an
approach thoroughly repudiated in Hanna," and quietly over-
ruled the troublesome case.
The Walker Court's reliance on a plain meaning analysis for
determining whether the relevant Federal Rule and state statute
directly collide 00 is similarly problematic. First, the Court failed
to apply its plain meaning analysis consistently. The plain
meaning rule asserts that words have core meanings that remain
constant regardless of the context in which they are used.101
Adherence to this view would have required the Court to give
Rule 3 the same interpretation in diversity cases as in federal
question cases. This is obvious because the literal language of
the Rule, to which the plain meaning theory ascribes paramount
importance, remains constant whether applied in diversity or
federal question cases. The Walker Court acknowledged, how-
ever, that Rule 3102 may toll limitations statutes in actions based
on federal questions.103 The Court thereby recognized that the
meaning of Rule 3 may change as it shifts contexts, directly con-
tradicting the basic tenet of the plain meaning rule.
97. For a discussion of a case evidencing such confusion, see infra notes 119-137 and
accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of Ragan and York, see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying
text.
99. For an evaluation of Hanna see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
100. "The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision
with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v.
Plumer applies." Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980). For a discussion
of Walker's reliance on the direct collision test, see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying
text. The direct collision analysis inquires whether the relevant Federal Rule and state
provision directly collide. If they do, then the Rule controls, provided it meets the last
two parts of the Hanna analysis, viz., it conforms to the Rules Enabling Act and is con-
stitutional. For a discussion of the Hanna analysis, see supra notes 64-75 and accompa-
nying text.
101. Origination of this analysis is normally attributed to Professor Henry Hart,
who contended that words have "standard instances" in which their meanings do not
change. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593 (1958).
102. For text of Rule 3, see supra note 13.
103. See supra note 81.
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Second, the Walker and Hanna'04 direct collision analyses
are contradictory. The Walker Court warned against interpret-
ing its decision as requiring narrow construction of the Federal
Rules in order to avoid a direct collision with state law.10 5 The
Hanna Court, however, stressed that the conflict between Rule
4(d)(1) and the Massachusetts service of process statute was suf-
ficiently direct because it was "unavoidable."'" The negative
implication of the Hanna language is, of course, that an avoida-
ble conflict between federal and state provisions might not
require application of the Federal Rule. A conflict between the
two could be avoided, however, only by narrowly construing the
relevant Federal Rule, contrary to Walker's admonitions.
Third, as an interpretive tool, the Court's plain meaning
analysis 10 7 fails miserably. The most obvious defect in the rule
lies in its assumption that interpretation of language requires
merely discovering the meaning of particular words. 08 But
words have no real independent meaning apart from the context
in which they are used. 09 In order to grasp the meaning of lan-
guage, one must take into account the purpose behind the words
and their necessary implications.
By employing a plain meaning analysis of Rule 3, the
Walker Court assumed that the Rule's meaning could be derived
simply from its twelve words." 0 A fuller and more accurate con-
textual interpretation of Rule 3 would have led to the conclusion
that Rule 3 necessarily implies that filing a complaint also tolls
the statute of limitations. The concept of commencing an action
connotes that the action has legitimately begun, and that the
limitations statute has not expired. The notion of commence-
104. See supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
105. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). "This is not to sug-
gest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to
avoid a 'direct collision' with state law." Id.
106. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). "Here, of course, the clash is
unavoidable .... " Id.
107. See supra note 100.
108. For a persuasive argument rebutting Professor Hart, advocate of the plain
meaning rule, see Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HAsv. L. REv. 630 (1958).
109. For the leading analysis of how words change meaning as they shift contexts,
see generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1958). See also M.
BEARDSLEY, THINKING STRAIGHT 154-57 (2d ed. 1956); A. WHITEHEAD, AN ENQUIRY CON-
CERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE 12-13 (2d ed. 1925).
110. Rule 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court." FED. R. Crv. P. 3.
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ment, and hence, Rule 3 itself, would have little significance if a
court could begin proceedings and then abruptly dismiss the
case as time-barred. Rather than illuminating the meaning of
Rule 3, the Walker Court's semantic plain meaning interpreta-
tion obscured and distorted it, leaving Rule 3 to perform an
absurdly limited function."' Using a plain meaning analysis,
lower federal courts faced with a Federal Rule and a contrary
state procedural provision could interpret the Federal Rule nar-
rowly by disregarding its necessary implications, and thereby
avoid the direct conflict between the two required for the Hanna
analysis." 2 The result would be unpredictable variations in out-
come among courts, and precisely the kind of disuniformity of
federal procedure the Federal Rules were designed to correct.
Had the Walker Court instead used a contextual, interpre-
tive approach to determining whether Rule 3 and the Oklahoma
statute were in direct collision, it would undoubtedly have
applied Rule 3 to toll the limitations statute. First, viewing the
language of the Rule together with its natural implications, the
Court would have concluded that Rule 3 was broad enough to
govern the tolling issue. After having met this first part of the
Hanna three part analysis, " the Court would then have pro-
ceeded to part two, and inquired whether the Rule exceeds the
scope of the Rules Enabling Act.'1 4 The test to be used is
derived from Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.," 5 whether Rule 3 "really
regulates procedure.""'  Commencement and tolling being
clearly procedural functions, the Court would have addressed
the third part of the Hanna analysis, whether congressional
enactment of Rule 3 was constitutional." 7 Under Hanna, a Rule
is constitutional if it is "rationally capable of classification as
111. The Walker Court outlined Rule 3's new role. "Rule 3 governs the date from
which various timing requirements of the federal rules begin to run . Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980).
112. The Hanna Court held the Erie doctrine inapplicable to the Federal Rules,
devising instead a three-part analysis for determining their validity. See supra notes 64-
75 and accompanying text.
113. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
114. See id. at 464-65, 472; supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
115. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
116. Id. at 14. Professor Ely suggests that the Rules Enabling Act language provid-
ing that the Rules cannot alter substantive state rights, rather than the liberal Sibbach
test, is the appropriate standard. The court in Platis v. Stockwell, 630 F.2d 1202 (7th
Cir. 1980), adopted the Ely standard. Id. at 1205. For a discussion of the Ely approach,
see supra notes 36 & 51.
117. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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procedural." ''1 Rule 3 being rationally procedural, the Court
would have held it constitutional and applied it to toll the
Oklahoma statute of limitations.
V. WALKER APPLIED
The confusion engendered by the Walker Court's reliance
on Ragan is demonstrated by a federal circuit court case that
attempted to follow its flawed analysis, Alonzo v. ACF Property
Management, Inc.' 9 Guided by Walker's strong approval of
Ragan,120 the Alonzo court omitted the first part of the Walker
118. 380 U.S. 471-72.
119. 643 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981).
In cases involving the precise issue in Walker, whether filing the complaint pursuant
to Rule 3 or actually serving process on the defendant pursuant to state law tolls the
limitations period, lower courts have followed Walker's dictate to apply the state law.
See, e.g., Calhoun v. Ford, 625 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1980); Rose v. Cantrell, 508 F. Supp.
330 (D. Wyo. 1981); Somas v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Some courts have also applied the analysis to situations involving Rules other than
Rule 3, and found the Rule sufficiently broad to govern the issue. In Boggs v. Blue Dia-
mond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980), the court found a direct collision
between FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) and the state substitution of party statute, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 395.278 (Supp. 1980)(official edition).
The conflict was less direct between the Rule and the state statute in Platis v.
Stockwell, 630 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1980), but there the court also found the Rule suffi-
ciently broad. In Platis, the plaintiff claimed that the trial judge erred in failing to
instruct the jury on plaintiff's inability to recover if found to have been at least fifty
percent negligent or greater. Id. at 1204. Failure to give this instruction, required under
Colorado's comparative negligence statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-21-111 (1973 & Supp.
1976), would have been error in a state tribunal, regardless of whether either of the par-
ties had objected. 630 F.2d at 1203. Federal Rule 51, in contrast, provides that a party
must object to a court's failure to give a jury instruction in order for it to be deemed
reversible error. FED. R. Civ. P. 51. The court found Rule 51 to be broad enough to cover
the issue; the direct collision with the state provision thus required application of the
Federal Rule under both Walker and Hanna. 630 F.2d at 1205-07.
Presumably, the difference between Platis and Walker is that in Platis, Rule 51
explicitly requires an objection as a prerequisite to assigning error while in Walker, Rule
3 does not state that it tolls the limitations statute. Such a small difference in language
should not, however, require a different result. Suppose that Rule 51 had merely stated
that a party must object to a failure to give a jury instruction, omitting the language in
the Rule to the effect that such an objection is required in order to assign error. Walker
would appear to require the higher degree of specificity for the Federal Rule to control.
See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. Yet it seems implicit that such a failure
to object is a prerequisite to assigning the omitted jury instruction as error, and would
appear to flow naturally from the requirement that one of the parties object at that stage
of the proceedings. Subjecting the Federal Rules to such semantic scrutiny can only lead
to variations in outcome among different courts, resulting in the disuniformity of federal
procedure the Rules were designed to correct.
120. "The Court reaffirmed that it had distinguished Ragan from Hanna rather
than overruled it." Alonzo v. ACF Property Management Inc., 643 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.
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analysis, the direct collision test. The Alonzo court instead pro-
ceeded directly to the second part of the Walker analysis, the
integral part test. Finding that the state statute embodied sub-
stantive state policy, the court applied the state law rather than
the appropriate Federal Rule.
Alonzo involved a direct collision between Federal Rule 6121
and a state statute governing the computation of time. The
plaintiff, Alonzo, suffered bodily injuries on October 23, 1976, as
a result of falling from defendant's apartment building. 122 He
filed a complaint in federal court on October 25, 1977, one year
and two days after the accident date. The California limitations
period for personal injury actions based on negligence was only
one year.123 The final day for filing the complaint within the
one-year period, October 23, 1977, fell on a Sunday, and the fol-
lowing day, October 24, 1977, was Veteran's Day, a federal holi-
day. Both the state and federal courthouses were closed on that
Sunday, but only the federal courthouse was closed on that
Monday; California observes Veteran's Day on November 11.124
Both Federal Rule 6125 and the California time statute126 provide
that when the final day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holi-
day, time is computed by excluding the last day. The issue was
whether to apply Rule 6, which would have exempted October
24 as a legal federal holiday, thereby extending the limitations
period to the date of filing, or to apply the California time stat-
ute, which probably would not have extended the period.12 7
Without any discussion of direct collision, the Alonzo court,
noting Walker's strong endorsement of the Ragan analysis, 2 '
held that the state statute governed. The court also applied the
Ragan integral part analysis and concluded that the state com-
putation of time provision embodied substantive state policy.129
1981).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 6.
122. Alonzo v. ACF Property Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1981).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 6.
126. CAL. CODE CIv. Paoc. § 12 (West 1954).
127. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Octo-
ber 24, 1977, although not observed as Veteran's Day, was a "day appointed by the Pres-
ident or Governor for a public fast, thanksgiving, or holiday" within CAL. Gov'T. CODE §
6700(m) (West 1980). If it was, the limitations period would extend to October 25, as it
would under Federal Rule 6.
128. Alonzo v. ACF Property Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 581.
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According to the court, the time statute reflected "a strong pol-
icy in favor of recognition of certain state holidays on specified
days." 130 The court thus allowed the state statute to supplant
Federal Rule 6.
The Alonzo court's failure to first inquire whether Rule 6
was broad enough to govern time computation is quite under-
standable: the court was obviously misled by Walker's reaffirma-
tion of Ragan.' Ragan itself turned on the York outcome
determinative analysis; nowhere did the Court mention the
direct collision test.13 2 The direct collision theory was created by
the Hanna Court and superimposed on Ragan in order to recon-
cile Ragan with its new perspective on the Federal Rules.13 3
The Alonzo opinion indicates that the court did not believe
that the distinguishing factor between Hanna and Ragan, and
hence, between Walker and Ragan, was the relative explicitness
of the two Federal Rules involved. Rather, the court found the
crucial distinction to be whether application of the Rule would
encourage forum shopping. 13 4 Accordingly, the court may have
felt compelled to apply the state law because, as in Ragan, its
use would "wholly bar the plaintiff's recovery."' 3 5 Use of Rule 6,
on the other hand, would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed,
encouraging the forum shopping the Alonzo court thought
accounted for the difference in result between Hanna and the
Ragan and Walker cases.
The Alonzo court's misapplication of Walker is not simply
the product of a careless reading of the Walker opinion. The
case demonstrates the impossibility of applying an analysis
which purports to harmonize two diametrically opposed theories.
Ragan was based on an Erie-York analysis; 13 Hanna repudiated
this approach and devised a radically different theory to govern
Federal Rules cases. 13 7 Walker attempted to reconcile the two
and predictably failed. Alonzo is simply evidence of this failure.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
134. Alonzo v. ACF Property Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1981).
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The serious defects in the Walker analysis raise the ques-
tion of what action is required in order to steer the law toward
uniform application of the Federal Rules. Three options exist.
First, the Court could overrule both Ragan and Walker and
repudiate the plain meaning test in favor of a contextual analy-
sis of the Federal Rules. The possibility of this occurring is
extremely limited.
Second, Congress could amend Rule 3 to explicitly refer to
tolling."3 8 The Rule would then clearly govern the tolling issue
under any interpretive theory. Amending Rule 3 would not,
however, remedy the problems resulting from applying the liter-
alistic plain meaning analysis to other Federal Rules.13 9 After
Walker, a Federal Rule will not be considered controlling on any
issue not explicitly addressed in the language of the Rule itself.
In order to mend the new holes in the Federal Rules created by
Walker's stress on semantics, all of the Rules would need rewrit-
ing to specifically address even the issues they implicitly but
obviously were intended to govern.
Third, lower courts could narrowly interpret Walker,
restricting application of its analysis to cases involving Rule 3.
This would seem to be the most realistic and effective course of
action. Walker can legitimately be limited to Rule 3 cases for
two reasons. Both Walker and Ragan involved Rule 3, and their
analyses are tailored to its contours. Moreover, the Rule 3 Advi-
sory Committee itself did not take a position on whether Rule 3
could be applied as a tolling provision.1 4 0 A plain meaning inter-
pretation of Rule 3, together with the inconclusive Committee
Note, raise questions about its scope not presented by other
Federal Rules. Applying Walker only to cases involving Rule 3
would be an appropriate judicial response that would contain
Walker's ill effects on federal procedural uniformity within a
limited sphere.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Walker Court's strong affirmation of Ragan and its
138. See Comment, supra note 28. The author presents a thorough and intriguing
argument for amending Rule 3. Id. at 1146-54.
139. For an analysis of the plain meaning rule, see supra notes 100-12 and accompa-
nying text.
140. See supra note 28.
[Vol. 5:307
Federal Rule 3
endorsement of the plain meaning rule for determining the
scope of the Federal Rules further confuses rather than clarifies
the case law interpreting the Federal Rules and portends a dis-
orderly combination of state and federal procedure in federal
diversity cases. The Court should have quietly overruled the
troublesome Ragan case, employed a contextual interpretation
of Rule 3, and applied Rule 3 as a tolling provision. The funda-
mental logical deficiencies in the Walker analysis will likely con-
found lower courts, as demonstrated by Alonzo v. ACF Property
Management, Inc. 4" The predictable consequence of Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp.1 2 will be frustration of the purpose behind
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the development of a uni-
form and predictable system of federal procedure.
Theresa B. Doyle
141. 643 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1981).
142. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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